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The tongue is a flaming fire, the very world of  
iniquity. (NIV. James 3:6a)
Freedom of  speech, individual rights, the es-
tablishment of  autonomy, the freedom from gov-
ernmental restraint—these are magic phrases.  The 
trick is to take those magic phrases and fill them 
in with the content that will then generate the out-
come that you desire. (From “‘There is No Such 
Thing as Free Speech’: An Interview with Stanley 
Fish,” [Australian Humanities Review, 1994])
Not too long ago, a discussion with a colleague 
at Dordt College led me to see the peculiar breadth 
of  free speech.  We were debating something that 
seems to have little to do with free speech—Dordt’s 
admissions strategy.  I suggested that Dordt should 
market more forcefully  to the evangelicals because 
I believe that many evangelicals would embrace a 
more structured approach to the academy, as found 
in Dordt’s philosophy of  integral Christian edu-
cation.  One of  my colleagues strongly disagreed, 
going so far as to suggest that his covenantal rela-
tionship with his family does not allow him to put 
his children in a classroom with evangelicals.  My 
colleague’s and my conversation directed me to the 
many permutations of  free speech, America’s most 
valued liberty.  While he is not typical of  all Dordt 
faculty, he had essentially argued that a certain type 
of  expression—evangelical—had no business on our 
campus.  Put in terms of  a legal analogy, my friend 
sees the evangelicals presenting a “clear and present 
danger” to Dordt, much as the Supreme Court saw 
the clear and present danger the seditionists posed 
during the incipient days of  free-speech jurispru-
dence.  In both cases the response is to silence or 
exclude the speaker, for less speech is—must be—
better than more.  
Free speech is a natural point of  scholarly depar-
ture for someone who teaches law-related classes at 
an institution known for rooting out the world-and-
life views behind creaturely structures.  “Liberty” 
has long been touted as the “worldview” of  the 
American legal regime, and Free Speech is seen as 
its best and brightest child.  In fact, the Supreme 
Court expressly identifies free speech as Americans’ 
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foundational right.1  Thus, any attempt to detail the 
essence of  the American legal landscape gravitates 
toward an exegesis on free speech, just as any at-
tempt to illuminate our free-speech jurisprudence 
with a faith-based perspective requires the addition-
al step of  comparing the Supreme Court’s narra-
tives on free speech with the themes we find about 
speech in Scripture.  And even though the majority 
of  the actors in our legal regime don’t adhere to a 
covenantal philosophy and are directionally at log-
gerheads with a Christian worldview, the compari-
son is still fruitful in that it reveals both the type of  
speech and the process we should use as Reformers 
seeking to reform all of  the world’s words for the 
Kingdom of  God.   
Synopsis
After sifting through several seminal Supreme 
Court cases in a historical look at how our juris-
prudence has developed around free speech, I look 
back to a famous Puritan who wrote what may well 
be the Christian treatise on speech.  His ideas pro-
vide a relevant starting point for any Christian re-
sponse to the Supreme Court’s doctrine, as they are 
sated with a faith-based world-and-life view, some 
of  which may be surprising to the contemporary 
Christian.  Additionally, we will see that many of  his 
ideas antedate the Supreme Court’s rhetoric, which 
borrows many of  his normative ideas on the make-
up of  a free speech paradigm.  I use his insights as 
a springboard for observations about some of  the 
traps into which Christians fall in their engagement 
with free speech, and conclude by proposing how 
we Christians should go about “speaking freely.” 
Before tackling this assignment, I must add that this 
in no way provides a comprehensive overview of  
American free speech jurisprudence.  I intention-
ally ignore such subjects as the state-action doc-
trine2 and the public-forum doctrine,3 as well as any 
detailed analysis of, among other things, obscenity 
laws or hate speech.  Also absent is any detailed 
review of  the effects of  federalism on free speech.4 
While these areas are fascinating subjects, such a 
detour would not substantially contribute to my 
purpose in this paper, which is to identify a better 
understanding of  how a Christian should engage 
our legal culture, in particular in the foundational 
area of  free speech.  In this way I hope to demon-
strate how my Christian faith shapes my work in a 
specific discipline. 
History of Free Speech 
under the United States Constitution
Nearly forty years ago the Supreme Court 
said, “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric,”5 and 
it has correspondingly spit forth many cases that 
put American jurisprudence squarely on the most 
permissive side—indeed what many might deem 
the vulgar side—of  the free-speech spectrum. 
According to the Supreme Court, for example, the 
First Amendment protects the lyrics of  2 Live Crew, 
who rap about “busting” a girl’s genitals in the song 
“Me So Horny.”6   It protects a magazine when it 
runs a parody of  a prominent preacher having sex 
with his mother in an outhouse.7  It protected the 
1928 Dailey News when it ran a moment-of-death 
photo of  Ruth Snyder in the electric chair, just as it 
protects the Globe’s 1997’s stolen autopsy photos of  
Jon Benet Ramsey.8   It protects Super Bowl com-
mercials that show a flatulent horse and a dog bit-
ing a man’s genitals.9  It protects the “expressive” 
speech of  a burning cross on an African-American 
family’s lawn.10  In fact, “If  there is a bedrock prin-
ciple underlying the First Amendment, it is that the 
government may not prohibit the expression of  an 
idea simply because society finds the idea itself  of-
fensive or disagreeable.”11  It is not surprising to see 
Christians recoil from the foregoing forms of  pro-
tected speech.  But developing what is one of  the 
world’s most permissive applications of  the doc-
trine of  free speech did not begin conspicuously. 
Free speech, in fact, garnered little attention 
from the Supreme Court for nearly a century and 
a half  of  our existence as a country.  For much of  
American history, speech was highly restricted, even 
given what appears to be a First Amendment word-
ing that appears to be strongly pro-speech.12  The 
States seem to have imported sedition laws whole-
sale from England; and even Thomas Jefferson,13 
the author of  the Declaration of  Independence, 
urged their use against his political opponents. In 
1798 Congress likewise promulgated the Alien and 
Sedition Act, which was highly restrictive of  speech 
critical of  the Federal Government. Congress did 
so, apparently with the approval of  most of  the 
Founders.14  And, for nearly one hundred years 
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after the Alien and Sedition Acts, the free-speech 
doctrine lay dormant, the Supreme Court employ-
ing a hands-off  approach to the First Amendment. 
In fact, the only speech-saving formulation of  these 
years was the prior-restraints doctrine, an adaptation 
from English law that had protected the press from 
the King’s censors prior to publication.15  And while 
the doctrine did technically free some discourse, it 
was neither adopted wholesale,16 nor did it prohibit 
the government from punishing the speech once it 
entered the public square. 
The Supreme Court entertained few free-speech 
cases; and those that it did, ran upstream in highly 
turbulent constitutional waters. In fact, the first 
free speech cases upheld convictions of  agitators 
involved in “public discourse,” speech that today 
would be considered core speech by the Supreme 
Court. The Court was unsympathetic to any form 
of  speech that had a tendency to produce any kind 
of  harm, no matter how tenuous the link between 
the speech and the harm, either in degree or dis-
tance.  The Court’s test of  the appropriateness of  
speech came to be called the “bad tendency” test, 
and it allowed a multitude of  restrictions on harm-
ful speech. But World War I and Congress’ prom-
ulgation of  the Espionage17 Act in 1917 offered 
an opportunity for reappraisal of  the parameters 
of  the First Amendment, especially since many 
thought that the Espionage Act served as much 
to chill speech critical of  government policies 
as it did to protect the government from subver-
sion.  American free speech jurisprudence thus first 
elicited the Supreme Court’s positive attention in 
several World War I era cases dealing mostly with 
radicals who were censured and incarcerated under 
the Espionage Act, which, among other things, at-
tempted to censure speech critical of  the war effort. 
On to this stage stepped a brilliant man who would 
forever alter the way we look at free speech. Indeed, 
in a very short period of  time, over the seventy-five 
years after the World War I cases, free speech would 
become unquestionably the most important right 
in a litany of  rights in the American Constitution: 
“Freedom of  thought and speech…are the matrix, 
the indispensable condition, of  nearly every other 
form of  freedom.”18   
 In the 1919 case Schenck v. United States,19 Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., upheld the conviction 
of  a prominent socialist jailed for distributing leaf-
lets urging draftees to resist the World War I draft. 
Holmes famously said that in order for the Supreme 
Court to restrict the speech, the words must pose 
“a clear and present danger” that they will “bring 
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right 
to prevent.” 20 Holmes’ “clear and present danger 
test” became a free-speech bellwether that would 
influence free speech doctrine for the next fifty 
years.21  The clear and present danger test provided 
the methodology to eviscerate the bad tendencies 
test, as it allowed free-speech advocates to require a 
much tighter link between the harm and the speech 
(“clear and present” rather than just a “bad ten-
dency”) in order for the government to repress the 
speech.  More importantly, it ushered in an age of  a 
tremendous expansion in free speech jurisprudence 
(Holmes became a darling of  the free speech enthu-
siasts), ultimately leading to free speech—in all its 
permutations—becoming the foundational right in 
American law.   
Holmes used this new-look free-speech process 
(this time in the dissent) in a highly influential case 
that followed close on the heels of  Schenck, Abrams 
v. United States.  Abrams and other Russian immi-
grants had been distributing leaflets critical of  the 
war-time Wilson administration and had received 
lengthy prison sentences under the Espionage Act. 
Holmes called the pamphlets “silly leaflets” of  
“poor and puny anonymities” and fumed against 
the convictions of  their distributors.  Because of  
the influence of  the academic community and with 
the support of  the early American Civil Liberties 
Union, Holmes attacked speech restrictions with 
far more enthusiasm than he had in Schenck:
Holmes’ “clear and present 
danger test” became a 
free-speech bellwether that 
would influence free speech 
doctrine for the next fifty 
years.
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But when men have realized that time has upset 
many fighting faiths, they may come to believe 
even more than they believe the very founda-
tions of their own conduct that the ultimate 
good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the compe-
tition of the market, and that truth is the only 
ground upon which their wishes safely can be 
carried out. 22 
Holmes’ marketplace of  ideas metaphor was 
the green light for a no-holds-barred competition 
for the truth.23  Added to the mix was Holmes’ 
conviction that this free-for-all energizes the polity 
and the individual.  (We’ll see that these are ideas 
that were originally published in a pamphlet attack-
ing censorship of  the press in seventeenth-century 
England.)  This awakened platform for free speech 
was, obviously, quite a departure from the Supreme 
Court’s century-and-a-half  inattention to the First 
Amendment, but it would continue almost unabat-
ed.  
 Ten years after Abrams, Holmes’ fellow justice, 
Louis Brandeis, in Whitney v. California,24  justified 
freeing speech because of  the importance of  dem-
ocratic deliberation, and therewith elevated political 
speech to the highest rung of  constitutional protec-
tion.25 
Those who won our independence believed that 
the final end of the State was to make men free 
to develop their faculties…. They believed that 
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you 
think are means indispensable to the discovery 
and spread of political truth; that without free 
speech and assembly discussion would be fu-
tile… that the greatest menace to freedom is an 
inert people; that public discussion is a politi-
cal duty; and that this should be a fundamental 
principle of the American government.26 
This shift to a viewpoint favoring more speech 
rather than less would continue to build momentum. 
In fact, democratic deliberation has become one of  
the most persuasive speech justifications, so much 
so that some have suggested that First Amendment 
protection of  political dialogue should be absolute.27 
And whereas most of  the free-speech cases from 
1930 through 1970 in America involved political 
dissidents challenging the political orthodoxy, other 
categories of  speech would elicit Supreme Court 
deference,28 thereafter (including offensive speech 
and hate speech) culminating in a free-speech ju-
risprudence that is one of  the most permissive in 
the world.29  
The Marketplace of  Ideas Model of  Abrams 
(or the competitive search for truth), and the Self-
Government Model of  Whitney30are regularly an-
thologized as two of  the three major models under-
lying free speech.  (I will detail the third, the Liberty 
Model, shortly.)  There are aspects of  these mod-
els that Christians might correctly identify as anti-
normative.  For example, we might suggest that the 
Marketplace Model highlights competition at the 
expense of  truth. The speaker who better markets 
his or her speech wins.  Or we might suggest that 
the Bible hardly seems to insist on democratic self-
government as the only valid form of  government, 
let alone as an appropriate rational for free speech. 
Just because it captures the spirit of  the open politi-
cal dissent favored by the Founders does not make 
it a persuasive justification for speech.  Nonetheless, 
these cases rest most fundamentally, I believe, on a 
worldview that is normative—the belief  that more 
speech is better than less.    
The civil rights movement and opposition to 
the Vietnam War produced a move toward greater 
protection of  speech in the ’60s and ’70s.  Perhaps 
the most cited example is California v. Cohen. 31  On 
April 26, 1968, at the height of  the Vietnam War, 
Robert Cohen entered the Los Angeles County 
Courthouse.  He was a wearing a jacket that said 
“F--- the Draft.”  Cohen was arrested under the 
California Penal Code for disturbing the peace by 
offensive conduct and was jailed for thirty days. 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by John 
Marshall Harlan, reversed his conviction, finding 
that Cohen’s expression was a clear-cut example 
of  public discourse, thus deserving of  the utmost 
protection under the First Amendment.  More im-
portantly, Cohen expressly established the point that 
speech has an “emotive function” as deserving of  
protection as its cognitive function.  Cohen thus 
linked the strength of  the political protest to the 
offensiveness of  the language used, a striking de-
velopment.  Cohen stands for the third major model 
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of  free speech, the Liberty Model, the model most 
closely associated with self-expression and indi-
vidualism, two ideas at odds with a Christian sense 
of  community and family.  This model sees value 
in speech as speech—the individual should have 
the right to choose his or her form of  expression. 
Indeed, Cohen is the case cited earlier that proposes 
that one man’s lyric is another’s vulgarity.  
It is not difficult to anticipate what developed 
following Cohen.  (Many Christians would call it a 
slippery slope.)  If  offensive language positively 
contributes to political speech, why wouldn’t  other 
forms of  expression also positively contribute to 
political speech?  The doors were opened to forms 
of  expression that ran counter to the Christian 
intuition about appropriate speech.  And whereas 
Christians might agree with aspects of  Holmes’ 
marketplace metaphor, based as it was on the the-
ory that a robust, uninhibited exchange of  ideas 
will lead to the discovery of  truth, they would most 
likely be far more circumspect about Cohen with its 
emphasis on self-expression, especially given the 
types of  “self-expression” to which they’ve subse-
quently been exposed.  
In 1977 the Chicago-based faction of  the 
American neo-Nazi party demanded the right to 
march through the “village” of  Skokie, a Chicago 
suburb with a Jewish population of  forty thou-
sand, several thousand of  whom were Holocaust 
survivors.  Their intent was to terrorize and to 
humiliate the Jewish residents with brown shirts, 
jack boots, swastikas and placards inscribed with 
“White Free Speech.” Despite the Seventh Circuit’s 
self-evident disgust for the message the protesters 
wished to convey, it ruled a ban on such a protest 
unconstitutional because is would infringe on the 
neo-Nazis right to free speech.32 This ruling was 
not surprising, in that the Seventh Circuit was con-
strained by Supreme Court case-law, which by 1977 
was highly speech-protective. Thirteen years after 
Village of  Skokie, in the middle of  a summer night 
in Minnesota, a group of  teenagers fashioned a 
cross from a broken chair, placed it in the fenced-
in yard of  a new neighbor, a black family, and lit it 
on fire.  Despite the terror that such an act would 
surely cause in a Nation with a history of  brutality 
fashioned by racism, the Supreme Court protected 
the teenagers’ expressive action and struck the St. 
Paul ordinance that prohibited hate speech.33  The 
problem with the ordinance was not that it chilled 
high-order speech; the problem with the ordinance 
was that it was content-based—aimed at only cer-
tain types of  hate speech.34 Justice Scalia pointed 
out that, “even when government is regulating a 
supposedly ‘unprotected’ category, it may not do so 
in a content-based manner.” The case illustrates not 
only the Court’s particular animus towards content-
based regulations,35 but just how few lines it is will-
ing to draw even when considering outlaw catego-
ries of  speech.  The Court believes that the govern-
ment must almost never skew Holmes’ marketplace 
of  ideas towards one side or the other.  Its role is 
to remain neutral and to ensure that a forum exists 
in which ideas may be exchanged, contested, and 
shaped.  The Supreme Court of  the United States 
unashamedly believes that more speech is better 
than less.
Milton and Free Speech
Any look at free speech should look backward 
to the great Puritan poet John Milton.  Milton is, of  
course, best known as the author of  Paradise Lost. 
Lesser known is the fact that Milton wrote what 
may fairly be called “the foundational essay of  the 
free speech tradition,”36 the Areopagitica, a polemic 
that fumed against censorship of  the English press. 
Milton wrote his essay in response to censorship 
laws that the English Parliament promulgated in 
an attempt to appease the Scottish Presbyterians, 
whose support Parliament needed in its war against 
Charles I.37  The Areopagitica anticipates several of  
the American rationales for free speech and presents 
an exciting vision of  how a vibrant, normative, free 
Nonetheless, these cases 
rest most fundamentally, I 
believe, on a worldview that 
is normative—the belief that 
more speech is better than 
less.
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speech jurisdiction might look.  Correspondingly, 
this vision brings into relief  the timidity—and the 
dullness—of  our own speech.  Below, I focus on 
two of  Milton’s free speech themes (and on one of  
my own) in the effort to compare current American 
free speech with a Biblically informed view of  free 
speech, and, in so doing, hope to make some sug-
gestions on how the Christian may better align his 
or her speech with a normative pattern of  speech.   
Truth Will Defeat Falsehood
Milton firmly believed that we should regular-
ly unfurl truth in the public square because it will 
ultimately prevail over falsehood: “And though all 
the winds of  doctrine were let loose to play upon 
the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuri-
ously by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her 
strength.   Let her and Falsehood grapple: who ever 
knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open en-
counter.”38  (Holmes obviously borrows from this 
idea, though he modifies it with his marketplace 
metaphor—he never expressly says that truth will 
always defeat falsehood.)  This is not self-evident 
to many Christians, however, who have, I believe, 
an inordinate fear of  falsehood defeating truth.  In 
the Christian academic setting, we encounter this 
fear of  speech not only with students but also with 
faculty and the greater community.  Our students 
fear viewpoints that will uproot them from the tra-
ditions of  their parents; faculty likewise fear view-
points that will contravene the academic stasis into 
which we too often fall.  We unjustly correlate new 
ways with wrong ways.  As communities dread the 
incursions that immigrants cause to established pat-
terns and customs, so we fear the effects that new 
and different speech will have on our regularities. 
We justify our defensive mentality with the need to 
“protect” our children, our spouses, our schools, 
our communities from untoward influences.  But 
too often this is an excuse to protect ourselves.  The 
root of  fear is ultimately our puny faith. 
My colleague said he would not put his children 
in the classroom with evangelicals, his main point 
being that the (false) dualistic evangelical belief  sys-
tem would overwhelm his children’s reformed one. 
Implicit in his argument is that falsehood (or at least 
what he believed to be falsehood) will prevail over 
truth.  His children’s true understanding of  the faith 
would falter before the evangelicals.  And it is not 
enough to say that he is merely protecting his chil-
dren for he likewise implicit in his argument is that 
the evangelicals’ presence in the classroom, their 
“falsehood,” would similarly defeat the influence of  
the instructors.  Such is what flows, I argue, from a 
world and life view that deep down is unconvinced 
of  the victory of  Christ over the Father of  Lies.  It 
is the speech of  withdrawal and surrender. 
The practical ramifications of  this structural 
assumption—that falsehood will defeat truth—
are staggering.  This is the genesis of  censorship 
liberally applied, even to the point of  using prior 
restraints—or worse.  It is not a stretch to suggest 
that the Inquisition, the Salem witch trials, various 
book burnings and other extreme measures39 are the 
results of  a fear of  falsehood bred by a soft faith. 
Furthermore, this posture is dualistic.  In retreating 
from an encounter with certain types of  speech (by 
not engaging it, by leaving it “out there”), we give 
the field to falsehood.  By not welcoming evangeli-
cals to our campus, for example, we allow evangeli-
cal Christianity to continue in its falsehood, if  such 
be the case.  We also make an assumption about 
the relative strength of  our “truth.”  By suggest-
ing it is unable to grapple with the falsehood, we 
suggest that it’s an unconvincing truth.  It’s a truth 
that will be blown about by the slightest wind of  
doctrine.  But this is not Milton’s truth or Milton’s 
speech.  Nor, do I believe, is it the robust speech 
of  the Bible. We need not fear falsehood.   In fact, 
we have a duty to reclaim areas where falsehood 
has penetrated, to preach the word in season and 
out of  season.  Christian speech is fearless, full of  
faith, ready to confidently tackle falsehood.  It is the 
speech that hurls mountains into the sea. 
It is Good for Us to Encounter Falsehood 
Second, the act of  seeking truth (via free 
speech) strengthens us, especially in the sense that 
it builds on our communal natures.  Milton argues 
that the very quest for Truth—and we must keep 
in mind that Milton’s quest is an uncompromising 
one where Truth takes on Falsehood—makes us 
wiser and stronger.  It refines our sensibilities.  This 
argument would seem obvious.  Christian speech, 
seasoned with grace, is to be not only uplifting but 
confrontational.  Iron sharpens iron.  We are told to 
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reprove, rebuke, exhort.  This type of  speech seeks 
out contrary speech and welcomes the ensuing de-
bate.  The early American republic was a beehive of  
debate producing numerous pamphlets and tracts 
grappling with an unimaginable range of  societal 
issues.  Central meetinghouses in towns churned 
with activity.  Speech wrestled with speech. But 
contemporary Christians too often seek agreement 
rather than truth.40  
Milton saw this grappling for truth as especially 
important for the community where energetic debate 
leads to a resilient, growing and adaptive people.41 
Much like the Framers of  the Constitution, who en-
visioned an active liberty that leads to a virtuous so-
ciety, Milton saw free speech—again, an aggressive, 
almost argumentative speech—as a necessary ingre-
dient in a vibrant polity.  (Recall that Brandeis like-
wise suggests that free speech consequently leads 
to a vibrant democracy.)42  Our communities grow 
as they contend for truth. This is truly a pluralis-
tic vision, one that sees one of  the most important 
functions of  the community as its participation in 
sifting though conflicting ideas about what is right 
and wrong.  And such communities thrive because 
in coping with competing ideologies, they become 
more adept at distinguishing truth from falsehood, 
at rising above dispute, at competent compromise. 
Indeed the more they exercise their energies in 
seeking the truth, the better they become at finding 
it.  But in order to have conflicting ideas about the 
truth, a community must have people of  different 
persuasions, creeds, backgrounds, and convictions. 
Different origins, different skin tones, a rainbow of  
attitudes and assumptions, all add to this respon-
sible cacophony.  
Too often, however, our first impulse is to cre-
ate homogenous communities in which we have 
little need to contest competing notions about what 
Christian speech, 
seasoned with grace, is to 
be not only uplifting but 
confrontational.
is true and what is false.  We may justify this insular-
ity by saying that we are protecting our children, our 
community, or our college.  In our small town of  
Sioux Center we are dominated by a Dutch heritage 
and churches overflowing with families raised in the 
Christian Reformed tradition.  Our sectionalism is 
further refined by populating one church with large 
numbers of  our college’s faculty members.  Another 
is made up largely of  “townies” and farmers.  Yet 
another is for the Hispanics.  Socially, couples most 
closely associate with couples whereas singles seek 
out other singles.  We encourage children to spend 
time with children of  a similar age, and seniors are 
placed in retirement centers with other seniors. 
This homogeneity is not limited to Sioux Center, 
Iowa, of  course.  The world is awash with factions 
seeking to isolate themselves from other factions. 
Normatively, we are a communal people, but we 
want like-minded, sanitized communities. And sani-
tized communities are static communities, for when 
we surround ourselves with those who are like-
minded, we emasculate the quest for truth by elimi-
nating contrary opinions with which to grapple, 
even though those opinions may be falsehoods.  
But we must stretch this analysis even further, 
for Milton says that falsehood may even “serve 
to polish and brighten the armory of  truth.”43 
(John Stuart Mill—a luminary in the free speech 
movement—would build his persuasive essay, On 
Liberty, around just such an argument.)  This is a 
rather shocking exhortation, for the process by which 
Milton sees the quest for truth as strengthening us 
is to welcome falsehood into the public square.  This 
is counterintuitive—surely we don’t need burning 
crosses on African Americans’ lawns, magazine sat-
ire about Jerry Falwell copulating with his mother, 
or song lyrics celebrating harm to young women.44 
But even given these exceptional and rogue exam-
ples of  free speech, this process is, I argue, a nor-
mative one.   
For one, welcoming falsehood—exposing it—
keeps falsehood from festering. Underground 
speech has a way of  erupting at unfortunate times 
and in dastardly ways.  Beware the leaven of  the 
Pharisees.  American constitutional jurisprudence 
recognizes this danger and has formulated the 
above-cited Safety Valve Model45 of  free speech 
in response.  And yet Christians often hide “bad” 
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speech rather than expose it.  We fear giving free 
play to speech that offends or shocks, or worse, that 
we believe will consume us.  (This is, of  course, yet 
another manifestation of  fear that falsehood will 
defeat truth.)  Our sometimes embarrassing efforts 
to censor speech bear the imprimatur of  this mind-
set. 
Furthermore, falsehood sharpens the contours 
of  the truth. We refine and hone truth by allowing 
it interplay with falsehood.  Put another way, truth 
is  sharpened, not just by truth but also by falsehood. 
Confronting ideas inimical to our own ideas, in-
deed allowing such ideas free play in our backyards, 
serves to strengthen, shape and even redefine our 
grasp of  the truth.  I spend time every day respond-
ing to emails from a non-Christian friend of  mine. 
Our latest disagreement was over prostitution.  He 
believes it should be treated as any other exchange 
of  labor governed by contract law.  So long as the 
bargain is at arm’s length and fair, it’s fine.  By 
having to entertain his numerous questions about 
prostitution in the Old Testament, Christianity and 
marriage, fornication, divorce rates and what-not, 
my own grasp of  God’s norms for relationships 
between men and women was strengthened.  I rec-
ognized that the truth is far richer than I originally 
thought.  Likewise when we are forced to tackle 
speech we consider antithetical to our own, we of-
ten find that we didn’t have the complete grasp of  
the truth we initially thought we had.  The outline 
of  truth reaches a sharper focus, our soft beliefs 
are firmed, and often we are humbled by the pro-
cess.  Ultimately we are reminded that this quest for 
truth is not about us and our need to be right but 
rather is about glorifying the author of  Truth.  It 
is, however, far easier to retreat and leave the fight 
for another day or to another person or community 
altogether.  Thus we quickly return to the commu-
nities of  speech conformity I detailed earlier.  And 
once a community successfully isolates itself, once 
our speech begins to go unchallenged, a strange 
thing happens, something I will consider at length 
below—good speech turns to bad.  
Failing to Engage with Falsehood 
Turns Our Good Speech into Bad
Engaging falsehood does more than put the 
truth in greater relief: it saves speech from itself. 
For speech left unexercised can turn on its own.  It 
is interesting that James, who warns so stringently 
about the evils of  the tongue, describes his Christian 
audience as quarrelling and fighting.  He says they 
slander and judge each other.  The image is of  a 
once godly community fighting each other rather 
than fighting falsehood.  In fact, instead of  reform-
ing the world, they have become a “friend of  the 
world,” an “enemy of  God,” according to James.46 
This friendliness with the world is evidently the 
fruit of  the poisonous words that James describes 
a chapter earlier.  It is not a stretch to suggest that 
their good speech has turned to bad.  
The great evangelical founder of  the Navigators, 
Dawson Trotman, said that Christians are born to 
reproduce.  We are (re)created and compelled by 
the evangelical spirit to engage in the multi-faceted 
conversion and discipleship process.  We are given 
a mandate to reshape and reform all of  Creation. 
Reform is of  our very essence as Christians.  And 
the only way to do so is to mingle with non-Chris-
tians and expose ourselves to non-Christian influ-
ences in the participatory work of  redeeming fields 
(and structures) “white for harvest.”   If  we don’t 
produce good fruit—if  we fail to reform—we 
wither like the fig tree of  Jerusalem.  We ultimately 
do the exact opposite of  what we are called to do. 
Instead of  giving birth, we die, for we deny our very 
essence.  Likewise, when we allow our seasoned 
speech to lie fallow, when we refuse to engage it 
with ideas and expressions inimical to our own, it 
withers and dies.  It becomes the opposite of  what 
it’s created for.  It turns to bad speech.  The Puritan 
expression moved from a “City on a Hill” in the 
first generation to burning witches at the stake in 
the third generation of  their American experiment. 
Not coincidentally, I believe, the Puritans were not-
ed for their strict and increasing censure of  dissent-
ing voices.  Their good speech collapsed on itself. 
Having lived in a somewhat sheltered Christian 
community for the last nine years has exposed me 
to many “poisonous words.” Gossip is rife, and 
slander is anything but uncommon.  We are highly 
critical of  each other and yet often dull to exter-
nal influences.  (Our complacent engagement with 
commercial speech in the form of  advertising is but 
one example. We often adopt the dress, habits, and 
speech of  those who advertise to us on the TV, in 
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movies, and over the internet.)  It is significant that 
we are created as speaking creatures by the Living 
Word.  God upholds the world by His speech.  He 
speaks and things are.  We image Him in our ability 
to speak words with purpose, resolve, and depth. 
Our speech is to be seasoned and is to be an example 
to the world.  Indeed it is to impregnate the world 
with its Truth.  When we remove our speech from 
the world, when we cloister ourselves in Christian 
communities, we are no less speaking creatures. 
But our speech has no Kingdom-building outlet. 
Rather than engaging with non-Christians and non-
Christian structures, our speech focuses back on 
us.  It is no longer sharpened by engagement with 
falsehood and atrophies.  Even worse, the impulse 
to speak  redirects itself  against us.47  Falsehood fes-
ters. Seasoned speech rots.  
Conclusion
Like all of  God’s creation, speech must be re-
deemed.  The free speech paradigm entertained by 
Milton and developed by the Supreme Court coun-
sels more speech rather than less.  But this counsel 
often produces speech in our public squares and 
elsewhere that the Christian rightly distinguishes as 
offensive, rude, irresponsible, hateful, even danger-
ous.  But this result, I’m convinced, is not due to a 
fundamental flaw with the First Amendment.  In 
part, rogue speech is simply a function of  the direc-
tional orientation of  the speakers.  Non-Christians 
speak non-Christianly.  We should expect free 
speakers, many of  whom have worldviews dra-
matically different from our own, to produce words 
antithetical to those produced by our Christian 
worldview.  Furthermore, an open speech paradigm 
welcomes directional interpretations of  speech that 
clash with ours, though it may be couched in re-
formed language.  Along those lines, any inspection 
of  American law encounters legal language that is 
conspicuously normative—truth, justice, equity, 
and fairness are all normative concepts that we find 
thoroughly integrated in our laws—even though the 
application of  those principles often yields results 
at odds with what we as Christians would anticipate. 
Stanley Fish, cited at the beginning of  this paper, 
calls free speech a “magic phrase,” intimating that 
we need to take the magic phrase and fill it with the 
content that will give us the outcome we want.  He 
is correct in at least one sense, and that is that some 
worldview will always fill in the contours of  speech. 
When we fail to engage these false worldviews, they 
will triumph.  Furthermore, when we fail to exercise 
our true worldviews, they will decay.      
Years ago a friend of  mine led a Bible study 
on “The Words of  Our Mouth.”  She developed 
an extensive list of  warnings from the Bible about 
speech: “A gossip betrays a confidence; so avoid a 
man who talks too much.” “He who guards his lips 
guards his life, but he who speaks rashly will come 
to ruin.”  “No man can tame the tongue. It is a 
restless evil, full of  deadly poison.”  “The tongue 
also is a fire, a world of  evil among the parts of  the 
body. It corrupts the whole person, sets the whole 
course of  his life on fire, and is itself  set on fire 
by hell.”  Her Biblical citations highlight our pro-
pensity as Christians to focus on what we should 
not say.  Constitutionally, Christians likewise focus 
on what the Supreme Court should suppress.  Our 
energies are those of  the censor rather than that of  
the evangelical.  But a Reforming perspective on 
speech structurally involves much more than hold-
ing our tongues or making others hold theirs. It’s a 
process whereby we not only expose ourselves to 
speech contrary to our own but actively engage it. 
This is an easy cup to pass, as the call to speak can 
be dreadful: Moses begged God to let Aaron speak 
in his stead; Jonah fled from the call to Nineveh; 
Isaiah cried out, “Woe is me, for I am a man of  un-
clean lips.”  Speaking forth may involve risk, judg-
ment, and fear.  Engaging bad speech may sully us. 
And trotting our speech out into the public square 
may ultimately humble us if  we discover our “truth” 
trumped.  As creatures made in the image of  the 
Word of  Life, however, we are called to speak forth 
Christianly.  Our seasoned speech is testimony to 
the world of  our Christ-likeness. Virtue, according 
to Milton, could not remain cloistered.  The Bible 
directs us to cry out for the Lord with our words: 
When we fail to engage 
these false worldviews, they 
will triumph.
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“You are the light of  the world.  A city on a hill 
cannot be hidden.”48 It is tempting to retreat from 
free speech.  But the challenge of  the Bible, Milton, 
and, indeed, the First Amendment, is not one of  
less speech but one of  more.  
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